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It is becoming increasingly recognized that our collective ability to
tackle complex problems will require the development of new,
adaptive, and innovative institutional arrangements that can deal
with rapidly changing knowledge and have effective learning
capabilities. In this paper, we applied a knowledge-systems per-
spective to examine how institutional innovations can affect the
generation, sharing, and application of scientific and technical
knowledge. We report on a case study that examined the effects
that one large innovativeorganization, TheGlobal Fund to FightAIDS,
Tuberculosis, andMalaria, is having on the knowledge dimensions of
decision-making in global health. The case study shows that the
organization created demand for new knowledge from a range of
actors, but it did not incorporate strategies for meeting this demand
into theirownrules, incentives,orprocedures. Thismade itdifficult for
some applicants to meet the organization’s dual aims of scientific
soundness and national ownership of projects. It also highlighted that
scientific knowledge needed to be integrated with managerial and
situational knowledge for success. More generally, the study illus-
trates that institutional change targeting implementation can also sig-
nificantly affect the dynamics of knowledge creation (learning),
access, distribution, and use. Recognizing howaction-oriented institu-
tions can affect these dynamics across their knowledge system can
help institutional designers build more efficient and effective institu-
tions for sustainable development.
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The importance of flexible, adaptive institutions in tacklingcomplex problems is becoming increasingly recognized, and
there is a call for institutional change that highlights the key role
of knowledge and learning in the context of action and imple-
mentation (1, 2). As a result, institutions for sustainable devel-
opment are undergoing rapid change. Existing centralized
international and state-based systems are increasingly being
complemented and challenged by new forms of collaboration,
including public–private partnerships, multisector collabo-
rations, and demand-led fundingmechanisms (3). These changes
are largely driven by dissatisfaction with the perceived inability of
traditional institutions to move toward more sustainable devel-
opment trajectories (4, 5) and pose new opportunities to link
knowledge with action.
In this study, we examined how one innovative, action-focused
organization has affected the dynamics of knowledge sharing,
generation, and application across their network of stakeholders
using a theoretical framing based on the concept of knowledge
systems. Building on work by Cash et al. (6) and van Kerkhoff and
Lebel (7) for this project, we defined a knowledge system as a
network of actors connected by social relationships, formal or
informal, that dynamically combined knowing, doing, and learning
to bring about specific actions for sustainable development (8).We
were interested to understand the role such institutional changes
did or could play in reshaping the connections between research-
based knowledge and action, which was experienced by key actors
in the system. Our research questions were:
How do innovative, action-oriented organizations mobilize,
draw on, or use scientific and technical knowledge in making
decisions?
How do their formal rules and informal norms or conventions
affect the ways in which scientific and technical knowledge is
produced, shared, applied, or used within the organization or
by the other organizations or actors with which it collaborates?
How do these knowledge-based interactions help or hinder
efforts to link scientific and technical knowledge with action
toward sustainable development?
The case study we chose is a major global health financing
organization, The Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and
Malaria (The Global Fund). Although health is not typically
regarded as a central component of sustainability, we view global
public health as integral to the goal of meeting human needs for
sustainable development (9). The global health sector has been
particularly active in institutional change (3). The Global Fund is
a public–private partnership founded in 2001. Since starting
operations in January 2002, it has approved expenditure of $10.1
billion for interventions on HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria
in 136 countries (10).
The formal rules and structures implemented by The Global
Fund are crafted to answer two critiques of aid financing: that aid
is typically directed to meet donor priorities rather than recipient
priorities and that aid expenditure rarely undergoes rigorous
independent scientific or technical review (4). The organizational
design that resulted has been described as a major institutional
innovation in global health (3, 11). This case study illustrates that
a knowledge-systems approach can help to identify and unravel
both the disconnects that hinder effective learning and change
and the relationships that support them.
In the next section, we discuss our methodology and present
the structure and background for our case study. In Background
to the Case Study, we describe the actors, the rules that shape
their interactions, and the implications of these rules for the role
of scientific and technical knowledge. In Findings, we present our
results, which are discussed in Discussion: Learning Knowledge
Systems. In Conclusions, we report observations on the ways
action-oriented organizations can influence the linkages between
knowledge and action. Policy implications of this study have been
presented elsewhere (8).
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Applying a Knowledge-Systems Approach.We used the concept of a
knowledge system as presented in the Introduction to frame our
methodological approach (more details of knowledge systems in
relation to existing literature are presented in SI Text). This
perspective had three main theoretical implications. First,
knowledge is taken to be embodied by actors within the system,
rather than to be existing independently. This actor-centered
approach directed us to focus on interviewees’ interpretations of
knowing, doing, and learning rather than attempting to evaluate
these activities from an external perspective. Second, knowledge
is regarded as inherently dynamic, where interactions within a
knowledge system result in the constant evolution of knowledge-
based resources. The emphasis on dynamics led us to explore the
potential for synergies or conflicts between different forms or
contexts for ongoing learning across the system. Third, the focus
on specific action served as a reference point from which to view
the success or lack of success of the knowledge system. We
specifically were not seeking to evaluate individuals or organ-
izations according to criteria that we had set independently.
Rather, we sought to understand the key actors’ own action-
oriented goals and assess the performance of the knowledge
system in terms of how well the institutional structures allowed
those goals to be met.
In keeping with our research questions, our focus within the
broad domain of knowledge is on scientific and technical
knowledge. We define scientific and technical knowledge as
beliefs that are justified by virtue of being acquired within, or
endorsed by, formal research or education settings. However, the
first implication of the actor-centered approach also highlighted
the importance of remaining open to our interviewees’ inter-
pretations of what was important in the knowledge system in
which they were participating. Consequently, although we
applied the theoretical constructs noted above and focused on
the role of scientific and technical knowledge in line with our
research questions, we also encouraged interviewees to consider
and present alternative perspectives.
Case Study Selection and Description.As noted in the Introduction,
our driving interest in this study was the effect that new organ-
izations were having on the use of scientific and technical
knowledge in the global health arena. We selected The Global
Fund as our case study, because it was widely held to be one of
the most innovative and ambitious programs to transform the
production of global public goods in recent years (3). (Other
scholarship on The Global Fund is presented in SI Text) Spe-
cifically, in relation to our research questions, an explicit and
significant part of that transformation lies in changing the way in
which scientific and technical knowledge is applied.
The Global Fund is innovative in a number of ways. First,
applications are required to be submitted through national-level
committees that include representatives of government, civil
society, technical agencies such as the United Nations Joint
Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and the World Health
Organization (WHO), academics, and the private sector. Under
conventional aid structures, these groups are often in adversarial
relationships with each other, so their cooperation represents a
bold break with existing institutional arrangements. Second, The
Global Fund requires that all applications be assessed by an
independent review panel based on their scientific and technical
merit. This shows a clear commitment to the use of scientific and
technical knowledge in The Global Fund’s core decision-making
process. Finally, as a financing mechanism for global health
interventions, The Global Fund is explicitly not a research
organization. Responsibility for the design and implementation
of programs lies with the applicants, a strategy designed to foster
national ownership of the projects. This again represents a sig-
nificant departure from conventional multilateral and bilateral
models of aid, which are often seen to be “donor-
driven” projects.
These characteristics of innovation featuring a role for scien-
tific and technical knowledge made the Global Fund an exem-
plary case for the purposes of our study. Within The Global
Fund’s operations, we focused our data collection and analysis
on the application process and decisions to approve or not
approve proposals, because this was the key process where the
goals of scientific soundness and national ownership were
negotiated and assessed.
To incorporate the perspectives of applicants, we selected two
recipient countries as subcases. These countries, China and
Haiti, were chosen because they showed very different scientific
and technical capabilities (12). China has a functional public
health system, many universities, stable government, and good
general education levels compared with many other developing
countries. Haiti has few or none of these attributes combined
with low human and financial resources. This was not meant to
enable direct comparison but to allow us to examine the different
experiences and challenges faced by countries with different
scientific and technical capacity in dealing with The
Global Fund.
Sample and Methods. Our focus on the application process
allowed us to identify a set of key actors: those who set the rules
of applications, contributed to creating applications, and were
involved in their assessments. We conducted 28 in-depth semi-
structured interviews that were purposively selected so that each
of the groups of key actors listed below were represented:
The Fund Secretariat (three interviewees)
The Governing Board (two interviewees)
The Technical Review Panel (three interviewees)
Country Coordinating Mechanism groups from our subcases in China (six
interviewees) and Haiti (three interviewees)
Independent technical advisers/consultants (five interviewees)
The technical agencies (e.g., WHO and UNAIDS who provide advice to The
Global Fund as well as to individual countries applying to The Global
Fund; six interviewees).
Within each group, we drew on key informants and publicly
available information to identify those who were most actively or
explicitly engaged in knowledge-based activities in relation to the
application processes. Interviews were conducted in English in
person or as a telephone interviews. Our interview protocol
focused on the knowledge-related aspects of the application
process with particular attention to changing knowledge needs
and activities and the effects of The Global Fund’s rules on the
use of scientific and technical knowledge. We also encouraged
interviewees to offer broader commentary on their engagement
with The Global Fund and to reflect on the state of scientific and
technical knowledge in relation to their activities. This structure
aimed to strike a balance between generating data targeted to
our research questions and allowing topics to emerge.
Interviews were transcribed and analyzed using open coding
and thematic qualitative data-analysis techniques. We also ana-
lyzed written material, including applications, reports, and other
documents, predominantly sourced from the Internet and
including, but not limited to, The Global Fund’s web site. The
primary data collection took place from April to July 2005.
Background to the Case Study
In this section, we present the different groups engaged in the
application process and the rules that governed it. We first
present the rules for applications as set up by The Global Fund
and then describe the main actor groups engaged in producing
and reviewing applications.
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Setting the Rules—The Global Fund. The application process starts
when the Board issues a new call for proposals. The guidelines
specify that the application must come from a Country Coordi-
nating Mechanism (CCM), unless exceptional circumstances can
be shown. All CCMmembers formally hold a right of veto over the
application. This is the foundation for The Global Fund’s aim to
support programs that are devised by the recipient countries.
The Guidelines for Proposals for Round 5 (the round underway
at the time of this study) noted 17 assessment criteria. These include
using interventions that are consistent with international best
practices, providing strong evidence of feasible implementation
arrangements, and showing that interventions are evidence-based.
TheGlobal Fund also requires that projects “strengthen and reflect
high-level, sustained political involvement and commitment” (13).
These rules send a clear signal to applicants that The Global Fund
seeks applications that balance scientific soundness with national-
level cross-sector engagement and commitment.
Applications are directed to the Technical Review Panel
(TRP) for assessment. The TRP recommends approved projects
to the Board as a group to remove conflicts of interest that may
arise if Board members were to approve individual countries.
Consequently, The Global Fund’s formal governance arrange-
ments effectivelydecentralize the scientificand technical knowledge
functionsby granting countries autonomy todecidewhat knowledge
they need and how they are going to get it. The change from being
somewhatpassive recipients of scientific and technical knowledge to
being active knowledge seekers and generators can be regarded as a
significant power shift in favor of recipient countries.
Creating Applications—CCMs. The Global Fund’s website describes
CCMsas “country-level partnerships [that] developand submit grant
proposals toTheGlobalFundbasedonpriority needs at thenational
level” (http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/apply/mechanisms/). They
bring together local actors with different experience, responsibility,
and constituencies into a forum for negotiation. Consequently, the
CCM needs to identify projects that are politically and practically
feasible across that diverse committee as well as meet The Global
Fund’s selection criteria.
InHaiti, the cross-sector relationships encouraged byTheGlobal
Fund already exist. Haiti’s lack of central government resources
meant that there was already an active non-governmental organ-
ization (NGO) sector that was providingmost of the country’s HIV/
AIDS care. Their first application to The Global Fund drew on the
country’s existingNational Strategic Plan forAIDS, which had been
devised in collaboration between the government and NGOs in the
1990s; however, it had not been implemented, because the aid
embargo in force at the time meant there were no funds available.
The National AIDS Commission essentially became the CCM for
that first proposal and therefore had an established history of
working togetherwith an establishedplanand set of priorities. Their
application succeeded in the first funding round.
In contrast, the political process that theCCM imposedwas very
challenging tomany of the participants in China. For the first time,
government officials, technical advisors, and representatives of
NGOs were forced to discuss budgets and program content in a
setting where each had equal decision rights regarding the pro-
posal. China had little or no history of engaging with civil society in
determining policy priorities; indeed, there is no recognized legal
standing in China for NGOs, and HIV/AIDS activists have until
recently been arrested and jailed for protesting against the gov-
ernment’s HIV/AIDS policies. Their applications in rounds 1 and
2 were rejected but were followed by successful applications in
Rounds 3 and 4.
Therefore, at the country level, scientific and technical con-
siderations were entangled with the political processes of setting
health-care priorities and action strategies. Although The Global
Fund’s governance arrangements changed the power relations
among participants in the CCM, they also broadened the kinds
of knowledge and expertise available to the decision-making
process, integrating political and scientific negotiation.
Assessing Applications—The TRP. The TRP members are pro-
fessionals independent from The Global Fund that are selected on
the basis of their expertise. They are instructed to act in their per-
sonal capacities rather than as representatives of their employers.
The assessment criteria used by the TRP also reflect the integration
of scientific and technical considerations with political consid-
erations. Although some have suggested that the political and
institutional criteria mentioned in Setting the Rules—The Global
Fund go beyond a technical mandate (14), members of the TRP
defended their inclusion, because they are widely accepted as crit-
ical to the success of a project. Projects that reflect international best
practice and high-level political commitment are more likely to
achieve good results than those that show only one of these attrib-
utes. To assess the scientific and technical aspects, members could
draw on resources provided by the technical agencies as needed.
Supporting Actors—The Technical Agencies. In both the application
development process and the assessment process, the technical
agencies, notably WHO and UNAIDS but also others in key
partnerships such as StopTB, provided knowledge-based support.
An important feature of the scientific/technical knowledge land-
scape was the work formalized by these agencies as best practice.
UNAIDS defines their best-practice guidelines as “accumulating
and applying knowledge about what is working and not working in
different situations and contexts [including] both the lessons
learned and the continuing process of learning, feedback, reflec-
tion and analysis” (15). These documents carried significant
authority, because they were used as formal guides by the TRP
when assessing projects; therefore, they underpin The Global
Fund’s claims to an independent decision-making process. More
broadly, they offered a key context and process for distilling and
disseminating knowledge.
However, technical agency staff was also often heavily involved
in designing and writing country applications. In China, for
example, the WHO’s country officer was on the CCM; in Haiti,
CCMmembers were alsomembers ofWHOadvisory committees.
This dual role of the technical agencies in providing both inde-
pendent sources of scientific and technical knowledge regarding
the diseases and advice to applicants was an important aspect of
the knowledge system.
Findings
Dynamic Dimensions of the Knowledge System: Learning. As noted
earlier, we examined our data to understand the role of scientific
and technical knowledge and specifically, understand the dynam-
ics between generating, sharing, and applying that knowledge.
Although The Global Fund effectively decentralized decisions
regarding knowledge to the applicant countries, we found that
decentralizing decisions does not necessarily decentralize the
production of scientific research or technical training to those
countries. Interviewees reported a rapid expansion of demand for
scientific and technical knowledge with no accompanying increase
in resources to meet that demand. This was experienced differ-
ently by our two case countries. Haiti met this demand by drawing
on both existing work (in the form of the National Strategic Plan
for HIV/AIDS) and on their NGO network. This made the pro-
posal process relatively straightforward, because they had an
existing political consensus that extended beyond government that
also showed scientific and technical consensus. Because three
NGOs represented on the CCM were also actively affiliated with
North American universities, the approaches described in their
proposal were already well-established in international scientific
circles and recognized by the technical agencies (8); therefore,
the CCM was well-placed to meet that demand from existing
knowledge resources.

























In China, however, there was a lack of extant data and tested
approaches. Combined with the political schisms present in the
CCM, this resulted in fierce debates that blended technical,
political, and cultural issues, including whether or not interna-
tionally accepted approaches to preventing the spread of HIV/
AIDS, like policies targeting injection drug users, were culturally
appropriate to China. Their second-round proposal to TheGlobal
Fund was rejected, in part, on the basis of it not addressing this
population. Their third-round proposal was successful when
commitments were clearly stated to target injection drug users in
future proposals. This represented a significant shift in Chinese
public health policy to accept the international position that
marginalized and vulnerable groups needed to be acknowledged
and targeted. Their proposal for round 4 followed through on this
commitment and included such well-established approaches as
methadone replacement and needle-exchange programs.
Another dynamic aspect of the knowledge system surrounded
the concept of best practice. Technically, The Global Fund appli-
cation criteria limit the contribution that countries can make to
their own applications to those that conform to accepted practice,
as illustrated by China. However, not only is the idea of best
practice contested, it is also recognized that best practice must
evolve over time to reflect successful innovations (16, 17). Recipi-
ent country experiences are crucial to this evolution; therefore, the
increased demand for existing knowledge was accompanied by an
increased demand for learning from experience as projects were
implemented. Capturing these lessons and codifying them in best-
practice repositories depended in turn on effective evaluation and
learning processes, as noted in the earlier definition. But resources
for this evaluation and learning were scarce, because technical
agency staff who would take this task on were reportedly over-
loaded with assisting CCMs in writing proposals. As one inter-
vieweedescribed it, “Who ispaying for the technical assistants?Not
TheGlobal Fund, they have to come from theexistingbudget of the
existing agency. So as a result the wholeGF application process is a
drain onfinancial and technical resources from technical agencies.”
Furthermore, The Global Fund’s own nascent monitoring and
evaluation processes were concerned primarily with administrative
and procedural assessments rather than substantive assessment of
the quality of the programs and their implementation. The Global
Fund staff publicly encouraged academic institutions to “step up”
to fill the gap, but at this stage, there had been little uptake. In a
published editorial, a former Executive Director of The Global
Fund explained this failure: “In programs that focus on imple-
mentation, the needs for operational research and for the proper
spending of the operational research budget allocation will never
feature highly in the priorities of the program managers, either in
the recipient organization or in the funding agency. In addition, the
individuals . . . responsible for achieving the goals of the programs
will typically not be researchers, not have well-honed judgments in
the field of research, and not be well connected with the research
community” (18).As several interviewees noted and evidence from
Haiti confirmed, long-term research partnerships can be a useful
bridge for countries with little or no research capacity, connecting
research, evaluation, and learning with innovation in practice.
In terms of the dynamics of knowledge activities within the
knowledge system, these findings point to inefficiencies that are
generated when increased resources for actions are not accom-
panied by adequate resources for learning. “Lessons being lost”
was a common refrain from all groups of interviewees. This is not
the case for TheGlobal Fund itself—as an organization, they have
embraced a learning paradigm and are well-known for responding
quickly to changing information. But the governance processes set
in place by The Global Fund had not succeeded in encouraging
practitioners to invest in learning in a systematic way, despite the
ability to include operational research in their applications. Haiti
stood out as an example of the positive benefits to be gained from
generating knowledge from previous efforts to tackle these dis-
eases and explicitly sharing that with the international technical
agencies and academic institutions. With technical agencies
stretched to the limit in providing assistance to applicants and The
Global Fund itself not taking on the mandate to do or require this
form of evaluation, overall capacity to learn at the international
level was limited. Thesefindings indicate several disconnects in the
knowledge system—areas where relationships between actors
have not been well-established, incentives for collaboration are
not present or well-recognized, and the dynamic interactions
required for effective learning have largely failed to develop in
significant areas.
Evaluating Success.Asmentioned earlier, the case study focused on
the application process as the key point at which the dual goals of
scientific soundness and national ownership were negotiated. The
success or otherwise of countries’ experiences in meeting these
goals could be taken as an indicator of the success (or otherwise) of
the knowledge system’s functionality.
China’s shift to conformity with international practice in their
fourth-round proposal was welcomed bymany in theCCMbut was
regarded by others as a major compromise in national autonomy.
Despite its considerable intellectual resources, China had not
invested early in knowledge generation and sharing, and as a
consequence, those opposed to the international models of
treatment and care had no convincing evidence to support an
alternative approach. Thus, they eventually adopted a model that
reflected international consensus rather than Chinese consensus.
Haiti, in contrast, maintained a strong sense of national own-
ership. Despite apparently few in-country knowledge-based re-
sources and intense political upheaval, they retained their sense of
ownership: “If you ask me why did [the National Strategic Plan for
HIV/AIDS] survive I say it’s because Haitian’s did it. I took part in
it,my neighbor took part in it, so and so took part in it . . . I decided,
we decided together.” This was reinforced by their ability to draw
on knowledge resources that documented their own innovative
treatment and care approaches, ensuring that there was no com-
promise between the two goals of scientific soundness and
national ownership.
Consequently, the effect of demand for scientific and technical
knowledge was determined in part by the extent to which appli-
cants could meet that demand from within their own experience.
Where recognized knowledge resources existed and political
consensus reflected them, country ownershipwas achieved.Where
recognized knowledge and political consensus did not exist, there
was a paradoxical recentralizing effect, a return to conventional
international sources. This could also be driven by The Global
Fund itself. Describing a change in the TRP’s policy regarding
acceptable malaria treatment, one interviewee said that it “has
been a highly artificial process, where countries change their pol-
icies because they sense that The Global Fund will completely
cancel their grants altogether if they do not put [the new drugs]
into them,” regardless of the countries having legitimate reasons to
stay with the older treatments, at least in the short term. The
Global Fund’s assessment processes can open up opportunities for
change but may also shut down innovation and efforts to learn
from local-level experience. For some, The Global Fund’s dual
goals of fostering national ownership and scientific soundness
posed real contradictions.
The role of technical agencies in advising countries on their
proposals also had the potential to divert countries from their own
preferred action agenda to one endorsed by the agency or organ-
ization involved. Within the countries, the technical agency staff
often acted as brokers, translating the application requirements
into a health program that was more likely to be funded. However,
these brokers can also use The Global Fund’s rules to push
applicants in the direction supported by the international agencies.
As one agency-based interviewee described it: “In the countries we
have very knowledgeable people. But they are necessarily confined
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in their focus based on the local setting. And you need somebody
from outside to open their eyes to alternatives. On best practices,
to say, what can we learn, where can we change, what can we
adjust? So it can work for you guys here.” Although this can have
very positive outcomes, some interviewees were concerned
whether or not applicants could maintain their own agendas in the
face of those external advisors.
Different Forms of Knowledge. Although the previous findings
related to our theoretical interests, another key issue raised by
interviewees was the importance of other forms of knowledge—
we called them managerial knowledge and situational knowl-
edge. They highlight that the connections between science, pol-
icy, and action cannot operate in a vacuum but must depend on
different forms of technical and practical knowledge.
The need formanagerial knowledge, the knowledge required to
effectively meet the administrative and financial requirements of
The Global Fund projects, was consistently cited by our inter-
viewees. Indeed, many of the technical issues that interviewees
were asked to assist with required managerial rather than health-
related expertise. The Global Fund’s rules imposed a corporate
style of management and accountability with which many recipi-
ents were unfamiliar and that they found difficult to implement.
An interviewee from a Haitian NGO recounted their practice of
sending their accounts back to their head office in the United
States, where their accounting staff generated their report for The
Global Fund, which was then sent back to the project managers in
Haiti, who then collated it with others and sent it on to TheGlobal
Fund. The implications of these shortcomings in terms of the kinds
of knowledge that were necessary, but typicallymissing, were often
unanticipated. These ranged from the simple difficulty of getting
accounting staff to the project sites (“it’s hard to get accountants to
live in Central Haiti”) to the complex challenges of trying to
strategically plan a national health program when the key funding
sources are uncertain. Importantly, lack of managerial expertise
directly affected health-care provision; one interviewee noted
that, in the absence of skilled administrators, the burden of
accounting and reporting typically falls to those who have themost
education: the doctors and nurses.
Situational knowledge was knowledge of the specifics of the local
situation—it may encompass elements of scientific/technical, man-
agerial, or political knowledge but could not be reduced to any of
these categories. Situational knowledge was more informal or tacit
and was closely tied to particular contexts and the actual experience
of individuals regarding the ways that these different factors and
others came together in a particular place and time. By devolving a
significant portion of decision-making power to the countries, The
Global Fund brought the applicants’ situational knowledge to the
fore. The cross-sector structure of the CCMs can be viewed as a
device for expanding the situational knowledge thatwas brought into
the decision-making processes—not only governments, who under-
standpolitics acutely but canbe far removed fromthepracticalitiesof
the field, but also practitioners and those who span the boundaries
between local and global contexts, such as theWHOcountry officers
and the Haitian NGOs. By bringing these groups together, The
Global Fund’s rules encouraged projects that were more closely
aligned with the political, practical, and technical realities of imple-
mentation in the field than might have emerged from government-
to-government bilateral negotiations, for example.
Taken together, these categories show the inevitable intertwining
of formal knowledge (scientific and managerial) and informal
knowledge (political and situational) required for action. This rep-
resents a significant shift in what might be called the knowledge
capability needed for good health programs. The knowledge and
skills needed to implement these health programs are multidimen-
sional and extend well beyond scientific and technical expertise.
Discussion: Learning Knowledge Systems
The findings in the previous section show that by applying a
knowledge-system perspective to the complex relationships across
The Global Fund network, the issues surrounding learning
(dynamics), scientific soundness, and national ownership (success)
and themultifaceted formsofknowledge requiredwerehighlighted.
In this section, we examine the broader implications of these find-
ings on our understanding of efforts to link scientific and technical
knowledge and effective action in sustainable development.
The challenge of linking research with action is not new to the
field of global health, and it is commonly referred to as the “know–
do gap” (19). The Global Fund was constructed on the basis of the
view that we know what to do to reduce the impact of the three
diseases (4). This has downplayed the need for efforts and resources
to be directed at learning from implementation experience as pro-
grams unfold (how to do it) and overlooked the importance of the
multidimensional nature of knowledge required. The findings
indicate that their conception of the relationship between knowl-
edge and action did not take into full account the complexity of the
structure of the knowledge system or the dynamics of knowledge
generation, sharing, and application.
Both China and Haiti illustrated the critical importance of col-
lecting, collating, and publishing research and evaluations to give
the knowledge system the learning capability that could connect
local experience with a global knowledge base. Important in this
structure was the forum that the technical agencies provided for
generating knowledge through ongoing evaluation and sharing that
knowledge through their various best-practice publications. Their
expert committees, staff, and consultants, in conjunction with
country officer brokers, were key boundary spanners in this knowl-
edge system, because they were able to connect across contexts,
scales, and knowledge types. Their role has shifted from simple
provision of technical knowledge toward blending technical and
managerial knowledge with country priorities and situational
knowledge, and connecting these efforts to a dynamic scientific
knowledge base. This integrative capacity is largely overlooked in a
field still rooted firmly in a technical conception of knowledge (20).
Although The Global Fund recognized that their processes
demanded innovation, the ability to capture the lessons from that
innovationwas largely absent—Haiti was anotable exception.This
was attributed by most interviewees to the lack of financial
resources to evaluate and learn from practice, to improve imple-
mentation processes and strategies, and to build complementary
managerial capacities. Although, given time, the “demand–pull”
approach for building managerial knowledge skills may yield
results, the lack of emerging supply reinforced the sense that
learning was not keeping up with practice and innovation in the
field at the time of this study. In this context, the overall efficiency
of the knowledge system in linking innovation, evaluation, and
ongoing action was low.
From a knowledge-systems perspective, however, lack of
resources is an important, but not complete, explanation for lack
of learning. Other impediments included the legacy of a technical
concept of knowledge that obscures other necessary forms of
knowledge; structural disincentives where funding rules encour-
aged conformity; strained relationships between TheGlobal Fund
and the key boundary organizations; and narrowly conceived
monitoring and evaluation requirements. Improving the efficiency
of the knowledge system in linking innovation, evaluation, and
learning with action requires understanding of the importance of
these knowledge processes and efforts to incorporate them into
the design of governance arrangements. Understanding the key
actors, the way that these actors understand and participate in
knowledge-based activities, and the reasons and ways that they
interact is a starting point for designing effective learning across a
knowledge system.

























Scholars in the field of institutional analysis have pointed to the
centrality of knowledge and learning in effective polycentric
(crossing multiple authorities and overlapping jurisdictions) nat-
ural-resource governance regimens. As Andersson and Ostrom
(21) have written that a “key aspect of all proposals for increased
polycentricity (as opposed to just centralization or just decen-
tralization) is the effort to enable institutions of multiple scales to
more effectively blend local, indigenous knowledge with scientific
knowledge . . . The key to the successful design of such institutions
is their multiple scales and their generation of information that
allows participants operating atmany different scales to learn from
experience” (21). Yet, tools or concepts for explicitly integrating
knowledge and learning dimensions into institutional analysis
remain elusive. The knowledge-systems approach presented here
may be usefully combined with polycentric governance analysis to
more fully understand, evaluate, and design complex, action-ori-
ented institutional arrangements.
Conclusions
Early proponents for the establishment of The Global Fund descri-
bed the steps involved to implement their vision of recipient-country
ownership and scientifically sound projects as “simply procedural,
[recognizing] the truism that the most successful aid projects
are those that are what the recipient country wants . . . and are sci-
entifically sound, in that there is scientific evidence that the selected
interventions are effective” (4). The possibilities that these two goals
could conflict, that other forms of knowledge were needed, and that
the decision-making processes associated with them is dynamic and
embedded in broader knowledge systems were only accounted for
partially.Thepotentially recentralizingeffect of international advice,
applicants’ heavy reliance on technical agencies, and the lessons lost
from early implementation all indicate that efforts to enhance
country empowerment and ownership need to be supported by local
and contextual knowledge production and structures to share that
knowledge.More careful and collaborative planning for knowledge-
based activities could have accelerated learning and increased effi-
ciency in reducing the impact of these diseases.
More generally, this case study has illustrated that action-
oriented organizations can be important drivers in knowledge–
action relationships, having a significant impact on theways inwhich
knowledge is generated, accessed, shared, and used across a broad
network of stakeholders. Although other work has pointed to the
need to consider power and engagement as central factors in efforts
to link knowledge with action in the context of sustainable devel-
opment (7), this study has shown that that the reversemay also hold
true. Governance structures that aim to redistribute decision-
making power and to promote forms of engagement to improve
action can also affect knowledge systems. These effects may help or
hinder the overall achievement of the goals of the governance
arrangements when viewed from a system-wide perspective.
Sustainability constantly presents challenges that are charac-
terized by social, political, scientific, and technical complexity and
that require institutional innovation. In these settings, under-
standing that the interactions between knowledge, action, power,
and engagement are a dynamic, interconnected system—and
learning how we can act more sensitively within this system—may
prove to be critical to the effective pursuit of sustainable devel-
opment. The concept of a knowledge system offers a constructive
way of incorporating these considerations into institutional
designs in a comprehensive, systematic way.
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